Security & Efficiency Showcase

Explore real-world examples of vulnerabilities and inefficiencies detected by our automated engines.

Analysis of a DeFi ecosystem (Vault, Pool, Token) containing critical logic flaws, insolvency risks, and centralization vectors. This case study demonstrates the engine's ability to detect business logic anomalies.

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Infinite Money Glitch (Fake Deposit)

CRITICALTool: DETECTED

Vault.solVulnerable Code

function depositStable(uint256 amount) external {
    // ❌ Vulnerability: Missing 'payable' and 'msg.value' check
    
    stableBalances[msg.sender] += amount;
    emit StableDeposited(msg.sender, amount);
}

Security Analysis

A classic logic error in Vault.sol where internal state is updated without verifying actual value transfer.

[CRITICAL] Infinite Money Glitch (Fake Deposit) Function 'depositStable' increases internal balances but is not 'payable' and transfers no tokens.

Human Verification

"The tool correctly identified that state variables were updated (`+=`) without any ETH being received (`msg.value`) or tokens transferred (`transferFrom`)."

Insolvency via Fee-on-Transfer

CRITICALTool: DETECTED

TokenPool.solVulnerable Code

function addLiquidity(uint256 amount) external {
    require(token.transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount));
    
    // Pool assumes it received 'amount', but actually received 'amount - fee'
    liquidityProviders[msg.sender] += amount;
    totalLiquidity += amount;
}

Security Analysis

Accounting mismatch when the protocol assumes it received the full amount, but the token contract took a fee.

[CRITICAL] Insolvency Risk (Fee-on-Transfer) Function 'addLiquidity' uses input 'amount' for accounting instead of checking actual balance increase.

Human Verification

"The tool correlated the `transferFrom` call with the subsequent addition to `liquidityProviders`. It correctly flagged the risk of the pool tracking nonexistent tokens."

Broken Swap Logic (Business Logic)

HIGHTool: DETECTED

TokenPool.solVulnerable Code

function swapTokensForStable(uint256 tokenAmount) external {
    // ... transfer tokens from user to pool ...
    
    // ❌ Vulnerability: Withdrawing from USER balance, not POOL balance
    require(vault.withdrawStable(msg.sender, stableAmount));
}

Security Analysis

In TokenPool.sol, the user swaps tokens but receives their OWN funds back from the Vault instead of the Pool funds.

[HIGH] Business Logic: User Pays for Own Swap The function calls a withdrawal targeting 'msg.sender'. This implies the user receives their *own* previously deposited assets from the Vault.

Human Verification

"This is a complex business logic flaw. Most tools miss this because the code executes "correctly", but the economic outcome is wrong. Our engine detected the anomaly in the fund flow."

Centralization: Unlimited Fees

HIGHTool: DETECTED

Token.solVulnerable Code

function setTransferFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner {
    // No upper bound check (e.g. require(newFee <= 2500))
    transferFee = newFee; 
}

Security Analysis

Owner privileges that allow setting fees to 100%, effectively creating a honeypot.

[HIGH] Centralization Risk: Unlimited Fees Function 'setTransferFee' allows the owner to set fees without a hardcoded limit.

Human Verification

"Heuristic analysis detected a setter function for fees without a corresponding `require` statement limiting the value range."

Automated Audit Disclaimer

These automated analysis tools are in active development.
They are prone to False Positives and False Negatives. AI-based analysis can occasionally "hallucinate".
Assistants, not replacements.Always verify findings manually. We accept no responsibility for funds lost.